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Long-term monarchical survival in the Middle East: a 
conﬁgurational comparison, 1945–2012  
André Bank, Thomas Richter
∗ 
and Anna Sunik  
Institute of Middle East Studies, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Neuer 
Jungfernstieg 21, Hamburg 20354, Germany  
  
The survival of eight monarchies during the “Arab Uprisings” has put centre 
stage the fundamental question about the durability of this subtype of 
authoritarian regime. Seen from a broader historical perspective, however, the 
idea that monarchies have an inherent advantage in retaining power is less 
evident: a number of authoritarian monarchies broke down and subsequently 
became republics (Egypt 1952, Iraq 1958, North Yemen 1962, Libya 1969, Iran 
1979), while others survived (Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates). To account for these divergent long-term 
pathways we systematically compare the 13 current and former Middle East 
monarchies. Using a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), we 
concentrate on ﬁve central explanatory factors derived from previous research – 
namely, external support, rent revenues, family participation, the monarch’s 
claim to legitimate rule, and hard repression. Our ﬁndings highlight the 
existence of three broad pathways to monarchical survival – linchpin 
monarchies, like Jordan and Morocco, versus the dynastic Gulf monarchies – 
and also reveal a possible hybrid third pathway, one which shares linchpin 
characteristics, but relates to cases on the Arabian Peninsula (Oman and the 
historical Imamate in North Yemen).  
Keywords: Middle East monarchies; authoritarian survival; family participation; 
rents; legitimacy claims; external support; repression; Arab uprisings  
 
 
Introduction  
The “Arab Uprisings” have cast new light on the discussion about the survival of 
authoritarian monarchies in the Middle East. Since late 2010, a fascinating monar-
chy– republic divide has hereby become apparent: while the heads of state in the 
authoritarian republics of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya have been ousted, it is 
striking to note that the eight authoritarian monarchies have thus far survived – and 
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this despite the mass demonstrations that have taken place, such as in Bahrain in 
early 2011 as well as in Jordan and Morocco throughout 2011 and 2012.
1 
The recent 
breakdown of the “Arab presidents for life”
2 
and the survival of the monarchies lead 
us to pose the fundamental question of what the speciﬁc conditions are for the 
survival of this latter subtype of authoritarian regime.
3 
 
Given that an authoritarian monarchy has not broken down in the Middle East 
since the Iranian revolution of 1979 when the Pahlavi monarchy ended, this article 
undertakes a historical comparison since 1945, systematically taking into account all 
13 cases of monarchical survival and monarchical breakdown. In the earlier period, 
spanning the 1950s to 1970s, it was these authoritarian monarchies that encountered 
particularly large-scale social protests, and a signiﬁcant number of them were 
eventually replaced by republics. At the same time, however, certain authoritarian 
monarchies have survived. Against this historical background, the guiding research 
question of this article becomes: what explains monarchical survival in the Middle 
East since 1945?  
We begin by identifying a number of deﬁcits and contradictory propositions in 
the existing literature on authoritarian monarchies in the Middle East, and underline 
the importance of a historical-comparative perspective that, ﬁrst, combines 
arguments from all of the previous explanations, second, applies them to all cases of 
monarchical survival and breakdown, and third, does so systematically over a longer 
period of time (Section 2).  
Section 3 introduces our comparative method, a fuzzy set qualitative compara-
tive analysis (fsQCA). Based on Boolean algebra, this approach allows us to test for 
the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions looking at ﬁve core aspects (external support, 
rent revenues, family participation, the monarch’s claim to legitimate rule, and hard 
repression) for the survival or breakdown of the two “outcomes”, the results of 
which are presented in Section 4. Our main ﬁndings are that three distinct groups of 
conditions can be said to explain the survival of authoritarian monarchies in the 
Middle East: First, the “linchpin” monarchies
4 
of Morocco and Jordan have survived 
due to their historical-religious claims to legitimacy, despite lacking rent revenues 
and despite no participation by the extended royal family in political 
decision-making. Second, the “dynastic”
5 
Gulf monarchies are reliant mainly on a 
combination of high rents and family participation in order to ensure their survival. 
A third group of monarchies from the “southern” part of the Arabian Peninsula – the 
Sultanate of Oman and the Imamate in North Yemen (until 1962) – point to a third, 
hybrid cluster of survival. With the introduction of the third pathway somewhat 
in-between the “classical” linchpin and dynastic types, our comparative approach 
helps to supplement the dominant “dualism” in earlier monarchy research on the 
Middle East. Our QCA also contends that among the ﬁve conditions none is singly 
sufﬁcient for monarchical survival. What is more, our ﬁndings show that it is the 
respective historical interplay of different conditions which is decisive for the three 
different forms of monarchical survival.  
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When it comes to monarchical breakdown in the Middle East, our ﬁndings 
reveal the historical complexity underlying the revolutionary events that occurred 
from the 1950s to the 1970s and highlight important case-speciﬁc developments 
rather than overarching trends. In the ﬁnal part, Section 5, we summarize and 
discuss our ﬁndings and highlight some lessons for the recent debates about mon-
archies in the Middle East.  
State of the art: monarchies in the Middle East  
The ﬁrst systematic accounts addressing postcolonial monarchies date back to the 
1950s and 1960s, when modernization-theory approaches studied the newly inde-
pendent states through the guiding dichotomy of tradition versus modernity.
6 
In this 
understanding, authoritarian monarchies represented almost the classical form of 
traditional political rule. They were considered to only possess very limited 
capacities in order to acquiesce to modern demands for political liberties, party 
pluralism, and the incorporation of more and more differentiated social strata – 
especially of the new, urbanized middle classes. This perspective hence often 
teleologically expected the rapid breakdown of authoritarian monarchies, as well as 
their replacement with “modern” democratic republics. It was Samuel Huntington’s 
notion of the “king’s dilemma” that famously emphasized the alleged contradiction 
between the monarchy as a quintessential traditional institution and the modernizing 
challenges that monarchical regimes face.
7 
 
While the “king’s dilemma” decisively shaped later research on monarchies and 
led to the “largely unspoken consensus among political scientists that monarchy is 
passé”,
8 
it can nevertheless claim only limited explanatory power for developments 
in the Middle East. While its focus on the monarchy’s institutional limitations can 
indeed contribute to the explanation of the monarchical breakdowns in, for example, 
Egypt (1952) and Iraq (1958), it still underestimates other Middle Eastern 
monarchies’ capacities for policy innovation and institutional ﬂexibility which – in 
contrast to the socialist republics in the region – has often allowed kings, emirs, and 
sultans to pursue a much less ideological, socially transformative and thus 
ultimately delegitimizing agenda.
9 
Newer alternative approaches on the survival of 
Middle Eastern monarchies, beyond the all too narrowly cultural(ist) ones,
10 
consist 
of ﬁve analytical perspectives: (1) geostrategic perspectives; (2) political-economic, 
rentier approaches; (3) an institutionalist, intra-family account; (4) 
legitimation-based explanations; and (5) repression-based accounts.  
Geostrategic perspectives put centre stage the external military support of global 
powers like the United States or, historically, United Kingdom, France, and the 
Soviet Union for monarchies in the Middle East. One prominent explanation relates 
to foreign and military aid as well as arms sales: Laurie Brand and Sean Yom 
respectively stress the importance of largely unconditional foreign aid for ﬁnancing 
the repression and co-optation of the domestic opposition, citing evidence from the 
resource-poor monarchy in Jordan.
11
With regard to military aid, it is argued that it 
  
4 
 
“can help fuel[ ...]domestic patronage networks”
12 
and that arms deals are a further 
way to cement the support of foreign powers like the US, especially with regard to 
the oil-rich monarchies on the Persian Gulf.
13 
At the same time, money from military 
aid and arms deals is not sufﬁcient to replace the needed domestic expenditures for 
funding the repression or co-optation of the domestic opposition. Sean Yom and 
Gregory Gause III have argued that a combination of “diplomatic assurances, 
economic grants and military interventions” account for the important foreign 
patronage that the US in particular grants Middle Eastern monarchies, and, further, 
that such assistance has decisively contributed to the latter’s recent survival.
14 
 
Rentier-state perspectives concentrate on the political economy of the so-called 
“oil monarchies”.
15 
According to Giacomo Luciani, the survival of Middle East 
monarchies can be explained by the continuous and high rent inﬂux via the export of 
oil and natural gas to world markets. It also relates to the rent payments made to 
loyal and geostrategically important clients such as Jordan and Morocco.
16 
The two 
approaches are complementary, as the monarchies’ rent revenues are supplemented 
by the ﬁnancial support from external powers.
17 
Together, rentierism can help to 
explain the consolidation of the Gulf monarchies after the oil price revolution in 
1973. The “hard case” in this regard is the Islamic revolution in Iran of 1979, where 
the regime maintained a continuously high level of rent income during the 1970s. 
Revenues from the export of oil were also a dominant aspect of state funds in 
pre-1958 Iraq as well as in Libya before 1969. In all three cases, additional factors 
would have to be taken into consideration in order to explain monarchical 
breakdown. Additionally, the focus on “oil monarchies” cannot account for the 
survival of the non-oil rentier monarchies of Jordan and Morocco.  
The third perspective has been directed speciﬁcally against a narrow rentierist 
perspective. In his ground-breaking volume All in the Family, Michael Herb argues 
that the conditions for monarchical survival can be best understood when the 
peculiarities of royal family politics are taken into account, in particular regarding 
the (non-)inclusion of parts of the family in key decision-making institutions.
18 
Following Russell Lucas’ characterization,
19 
Herb differentiates between so-called 
“dynastic monarchies” and “linchpin monarchies.” In the ﬁve dynastic monarchies 
of the Persian Gulf, the ruling family determines political decision-making by 
consensus. The family acts as a “ruling institution” and monopolizes the central 
positions in both the administration and the security apparatus.
20 
In the linchpin 
monarchies of Jordan and Morocco, as well as the collapsed monarchies of Egypt 
(1952), Iraq (1958), Libya (1969), and Iran (1979), the monarch – with the support 
of the respective royal court – has balanced between other inﬂuential institutions 
like the army or the parliament.
21 
Herb’s concentration on the trajectories of dynastic 
monarchies does not ultimately provide a satisfactory explanation for the broader set 
of monarchies in the Middle East. He neither explains the survival of the 
“non-dynastic monarchies” in Jordan and Morocco nor does he sufﬁciently 
substantiate his core argument that family participation shields monarchies from 
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breaking down. This shortfall is also due to the fact that all of the analysed dynastic 
monarchies are also oil-rich, and thus family participation has historically always 
been connected with high income from rents.
22  
The fourth perspective addresses the politics of legitimation.
23 
Oliver Schlumberger 
differentiates between four “core competences” for survival.
24 
The ﬁrst component, 
religion, is of particular importance in the monarchies of Jordan, Morocco, and 
Saudi Arabia, especially when contrasted to other existing monarchies as well as the 
authoritarian republics (with the exception of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
post-1979).
25 
The monarch’s religious legitimacy can be instrumentalized against the 
Islamist opposition in times of crises.
26 
The second component, tradition, can also be 
considered a (re)source of legitimation, as the general policy among the Gulf 
monarchies of reinventing tradition indicates.
27 
Within the third component, ideology, 
Schlumberger concentrates on the Middle Eastern republics alone, since they base 
their historic claim to leadership on revolutionary and often Arab socialist ideas.
28 
The fourth component, material legitimation, refers to the political-economic 
dimension in the allocation or distribution of state resources – key to ensuring the 
loyalty of inﬂuential social groups. While the illustrations of different legitimation 
strategies abound, the other side of the equation – the acceptance of those strategies 
by the target audience – is often omitted, since it is hard both to deﬁne and to 
operationalize.  
The ﬁfth and ﬁnal perspective analyses the relevance of repression. With regard 
to Middle East authoritarian regimes in general and monarchies in particular, 
repression-based approaches are still in their infancy, even though the region as a 
whole has been characterized by a particularly high level of political and civil lib-
erties restrictions since the 1970s.
29
Two perspectives on repression in the Middle 
East can be distinguished. Spinks, Sahliyeh, and Calfano ﬁnd that between 1980 and 
2005 monarchies in the Middle East commit less personal integrity violations (hard 
repression) than their republican counterparts in the region. They do not, however, 
see a regime type effect when it comes to constraining, that is, “soft” forms of 
repression.
30 
A recent study of Bahrain and Egypt post-2011 shows that this earlier 
monarchy-republic distinction does not hold in the context of the “Arab Uprisings”,
31 
thus leaving results for the employed forms of repression inconclusive. The second 
perspective on repression in the Middle East does not make a distinction between 
authoritarian monarchies and republics. Eva Bellin explains the robustness of 
authoritarian regimes in the region from the 1970s to the 2000s with a particular 
constellation of four inter-related features
32
: First, the availability of rents keeps the 
repressive apparatuses ﬁscally healthy; second, the geostrategic importance of the 
Middle East ensures the existence of international networks which support strong 
coercive institutions; third, the low level of institutionalization and often patrimonial 
structure of security apparatuses increases their inclination to use harsh violence 
against potential regime challenges; and fourth, the low levels of social mobilization 
prevent the emergence of strong regime challenges in the ﬁrst place. In light of the 
“Arab Uprisings”, Eva Bellin has recently reconsidered her earlier analysis. She 
ﬁnds that, broadly, the interplay of the four factors still exists, even though it is 
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particularly the institutional structure of the repressive apparatuses which 
determines the survival or breakdown of the authoritarian regimes.
33 
 
Comparative research on monarchies in the Middle East can be demarcated 
along geostrategic, political-economic, intra-family, legitimatory and/or repres-
sion-based lines. These ﬁve broad perspectives have allowed for a growing differ-
entiation in the explanatory factors for monarchical survival. With its focus on the 
joint occurrence of at least two of the following three factors – geostrategic foreign 
patronage, political-economic rents, and a domestic, cross-cutting coalition – only 
the recent study by Yom and Gause on monarchical survival during the “Arab 
Uprisings” has presented more explanatory factors than the one or two typically 
offered.
34 
A systematic comparison of key arguments from all ﬁve perspectives is, 
however, still lacking. In addition, only Michael Herb’s analysis covers the cases of 
broken-down monarchies during the era of the early 1950s (Egypt) to the late 1970s 
(Iran), and thus takes a longer-term historical perspective than the mainstream 
“here-and-now” approaches.
35 
This article thus follows Herb’s exemplary study – but 
does it more systematically by including all ﬁve cases of breakdown, including the 
fall of the Zaydi monarchy in North Yemen in 1962.Taken together, this threefold 
extension – in terms of explanatory conditions, historical depth, and breakdown 
cases – of the comparative analysis on monarchical survival in the Middle East is 
undertaken in the empirical sections that follow.  
Fuzzy set QCA as a method of systematic comparison  
In our empirical analysis we use an fsQCA in order to systematically identify the 
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions that explain the survival as well as the break-
down of authoritarian monarchies in the Middle East since 1945.
36 
To the best of our 
knowledge, an fsQCA has to date not been used to analyse authoritarian regimes in 
the Middle East.  
FsQCA belongs to a cluster of relatively new formal set-theory data analysis 
techniques that are “concerned with the systematic matching and contrasting of 
cases to establish common causal relationships by eliminating all other possibili-
ties”.
37 
Originally introduced by Charles Ragin in the late 1980s to be used with 
binomially scaled data sets (crisp set QCA), the technique has since been further 
developed; currently, it is able to deal with ordinal scaled data.
38 
Set-theory 
approaches have become an interesting complement to the prevailing statistical and 
case study techniques within the tradition of macro-comparative research designs.  
QCA analyses proceed in four steps – ﬁrst, with a process of calibration: 
measures for conditions and the outcome are transformed into set-theory categor-
izations.
39 
In fsQCA, outcomes and conditions need to be ordinal scaled within a 
binominal value range between zero and one. The value of 0.5 signals a crossover 
point at which a case is neither in nor out of a speciﬁc value set. Cases above or 
below 0.5 are coded according to their degrees of membership, using previously  
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deﬁned criteria. We decided to use different fuzzy set scales in the following analy-
sis. More details on the creation of these scales are given in Section 4.  
Second, using these set-theory measures a truth table is constructed with 2
k 
rows 
– with k being the number of conditions – in which each row represents one of the 
possible combinations of conditions. All existing cases are allocated to these rows 
according to the values of these conditions. Most likely, some rows will contain 
only a few cases, while others will consist of many. There will also be empty rows, 
indicating that none of the empirical cases ﬁts with this speciﬁc combination of 
conditions.  
In a third step, the number of rows in the truth table is reduced by looking only 
at those with which empirical cases are associated. Rows with no empirical case – 
so-called logical remainders – are deleted. For all remaining rows consistency 
values are calculated. Consistency in fsQCA corresponds to the degree to which 
cases ﬁt to the set-theory relationship expressed in the solution.
40 
The recommended 
minimum level of consistency lies between 0.75 and 0.80. All rows below this level 
are not included in the analysis.  
Fourth, a Boolean algorithm is used in order to logically reduce the rows into 
simpliﬁed solutions based on the counterfactual analysis of conditions. Based on 
two Boolean expressions – the logical AND ¼ “
∗
” and the logical OR ¼ “+” – this 
Boolean minimization results in solution formulas that point to the sufﬁcient 
conditions or combinations of sufﬁcient conditions that explain a certain outcome.  
 
Empirical analysis: monarchical survival and breakdown in the Middle 
East, 1945–2012  
Selection of cases and calibration of outcome and conditions  
Our base sample consists of all monarchies existent in the Middle East between 
1945 and 2012. Currently there are eight monarchies in the Middle East, which are 
supplemented by ﬁve historical cases of monarchical breakdown: Egypt 1952, Iraq 
1958, North Yemen 1962, Libya 1969, and Iran 1979. Altogether, this adds up to 13 
authoritarian monarchies.
41 
 
Amajor challenge for a historical-conﬁgurative approach that looks at regimes 
over an extended period is that values of outcomes and conditions might change 
over time. Since there is no standard procedure for solving this problem in QCA, we 
have opted to divide into shorter time periods the study for each of the monarchical 
regimes, on the basis of meaningful and transparent criteria. Our unit of analysis is a 
country period. In order to create country periods we have used a two-step 
procedure: First, we divided each of the countries into historical periods depending 
on who the monarch was. We call this the ruling period. For instance, Morocco has 
been divided into three ruling periods: 1956 – 1961 under King Muhammad V, 1961 
– 1999 under King Hassan II, and 1999 – 2012 under King Muhammad VI.
42 
Second, 
we have further subdivided ruling periods for each country using data on attempted 
coup d’états by cross-checking the two data sets “Global Instances of Coups”
43
and 
“Coup d’État Events.” 
44 
If, for instance, an attempted coup was reported within a 
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given ruling period, this period was then split into two country periods with the 
division corresponding to the year in which the coup took place. In implementing 
this procedure, there are altogether 39 identiﬁed country periods for the 13 Middle 
Eastern monarchies in existence between 1945 and 2012. The political event that we 
are interested in corresponds to our empirical assessment regarding the survival or 
breakdown of authoritarian monarchies at the end of each country period (survival). 
While the list of country periods as well as the ﬁnal codings of Yare 
presentedinTable3inthe Online Appendix, in the following we extensively discuss 
criteria and procedures.  
In principle, each country period has been given a value of one (1) if the cor-
responding authoritarian regime stayed in power during the last year of a country 
period. Each country period has been given a value of zero (0) if the monarchy lost 
power. The latter occurred in only ﬁve of the 39 country periods, the above-men-
tioned breakdowns. In addition to the decision about whether a country period is a 
member of the set of surviving cases (1) or a member of the set of non-surviving 
cases – which equals breakdown (0) – we have used the longevity of a regime to 
estimate the general durability of either surviving or collapsed monarchies. This 
data has then been used for a ﬁner grading of the initial coding. There are three 
levels of durability among the survival (0.6; 0.8; 1) as well as the breakdown (0; 0.2; 
0.4) cases, which respectively correspond to low(1 –28 years), medium (29–56 
years), and high(57 –84 years) durability. The thresholds for the groups were 
determined by dividing the duration of the regimes into thirds.
45 
 
In Section2 we argued that the question of monarchical survival in the Middle 
East monarchies has been analysed along geostrategic, political-economic, intra-
family, legitimatory, and/or repression-based lines. Drawing on this earlier system-
atization, we have thus selected ﬁve measures in total, each corresponding to one of 
these dimensions:  
(A) Strategic external support by the leading Western powers, the US, the UK and 
France (esupport), relates to the geostrategic dimension of monarchical survival.  
(B) Rent revenues (rents) ﬂowing into state coffers due to the export of natural 
resources such as oil and natural gas are at the core of political-economic 
explanations for monarchical survival.  
(C) Family participation (family) in political decision-making.  
(D) The monarch’s claim to legitimate rule (leg-claim) – based on historical and/or 
religious premises – is a central aspect of the political legitimation from above.  
(E) Hard repression, which is sometimes, but not regularly, used to quell opposition 
within and outside of the monarchical regime.  
 
The following paragraphs brieﬂy explain the more general procedures and criteria 
that we have used to calibrate each condition. A complete list of all calibrations is 
presented inTable3 of the Online Appendix.  
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 (A) Strategic external support by major Western powers (esupport)  
While the provision of external support to an authoritarian regime is a complex, 
multidimensional and sometimes even contradictory phenomenon, for the sake of 
clarity we rely on a simplistic understanding: Using a fuzzy calibration, we use arms 
sales from the US, the UK, and France as a proxy for the degree of strategic external 
support by major foreign powers. Since arms sales above an average degree cement 
the donor’s commitment to the recipient’s strategic relevance, they seem to be a 
relatively sensible indicator for what Yom and Gause would call foreign patronage. 
Data for arms sales of all three Western powers are available since 1950 from the 
SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.
46 
To establish a fuzzy scale of external strategic 
importance, we use the direct method of calibration, as suggested by Ragin.
47 
As 
requested there, we have to deﬁne three different thresholds: non-membership (0), 
the crossover point (0.5), and full membership (1). If there are no arms sales to a 
given country, we interpret this as being a full non-member of the set of strategically 
important monarchies and code 0. Coding decisions on the upper bound of 1 as well 
as on the crossover point of 0.5 are more challenging. We decided to follow a 
strategy of global mean distribution here. If a monarchy receives arms sales from all 
three Western powers, which is above the global mean of total arms sales from the 
same three Western powers, this monarchy then belongs to the set of strategically 
important countries. In calibrating the crossover point of 0.5, we therefore use the 
annual global mean of arms sales from the US, the UK, and France.Tobea complete 
member of the set of strategically important countries, we deﬁne one standard 
deviation above the mean as the upper bound for being qualiﬁed for a coding of 1. 
Means and standard deviations are then averaged over respective country periods 
and compared to the country speciﬁc averages of arms sales. The ﬁnal calibration of 
this fuzzy scale is presented inTable3 of the Online Appendix.  
 
(B) Rents revenues (rents) 
While in the recent literature on the distributive capacities of the rentier state an 
important distinction has been made between resource dependency – measured as 
the ratio of rent revenues to gross domestic product (GDP) or to total state revenues 
– and resource abundance – measured as the per capita value of rents available in 
the state budget – the (limited) availability of historical data permits us to use rent 
dependency only as an indicator.
48 
As part of the Global State Revenue and 
Expenditure (GSRE) data set, there is historical data available on the value of state 
revenues accruing to tax and non-tax payments based on the production of natural 
resources.
49 
Due to the lower coverage of data using the per capita indicator, we 
decided to use the share of state revenues from primary commodities as a share of 
total state revenues as our primary estimator in calibrating the average level of rents 
available to the monarch.  
 
In order to calibrate the fuzzy scale for rents, we again apply the direct method 
of calibration. For full membership (1), we use the Luciani threshold of 0.40 rents  
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as a share of total state revenues.
50 
Having less than 0.05 rents as a share of total 
revenues constitutes full non-membership (0) within the concept of a rentier state; 
0.20 rents as a share of total revenues then points toward the crossover point (0.5).  
(C) Family participation 
The family as a ruling institution – understood as the monopolization by members 
of the ruling families of “the highest state ofﬁces, including the premiership and the 
portfolios of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence, the ministries known in the Gulf 
as wizarat al-siyada, or ministries of sovereignty” – is an important condition in 
explaining the survival of Middle East monarchies.
51 
On the basis of Herb’s  
classic study, and complemented by our own analysis, we coded a fuzzy scale of 
family participation using the following criteria:  
(1) If family members are explicitly excluded by constitution, law, or decree we 
coded a value of 0.  
(2) If family members are allowed to rule, and are found to dominate one of the 
relevant state institutions like the cabinet, ministries, public sector companies, the 
ruling party, and/or the military and security apparatus, we coded a value of 0.33.  
(3) If family members are allowed to rule, and are found to dominate at least two 
separate relevant state institutions like the cabinet, ministries, public sector 
companies, the ruling party, and/or the military and security apparatus, we coded a 
value of 0.67.  
(4) If family members are allowed to rule, and are found to dominate in the majority 
of the different relevant state institutions like the cabinet, ministries, public sector 
companies, the ruling party, and/or the military and security apparatus, we coded a 
value of 1.  
 
(D) The monarch’s claim to legitimate rule (leg-claim)  
Measuring legitimation is a notoriously difﬁcult task. Given the current options, we 
decided to restrict our codings to a narrow understanding of legitimation that com-
bines a primary aspect with a number of secondary sub-dimensions.
52 
Based on the 
country and Middle East monarchy literature, which highlights the role of religion 
for monarchical legitimation, we estimated whether forms of religious heritage and 
practices – descent from Prophet Muhammad, the performance of institutionalized 
religious functions and alliance with religious authorities – were used by the ruler as 
a strategy to justify his rule. This operationalization, we think, is broad enough to 
incorporate various forms of religious claims. If religious heritage and practices 
were existent during a country period, we coded the fuzzy value of legitimation as 
being above the crossover point of 0.5.
 53 
Additionally, we used four characteristics 
of the respective political regime, derived from the concept of legitimation 
articulated by Beetham, to specify the multidimensionality of the concept: (a)  
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personality cult and charismatic leadership; (b) regional engagement (legitimation 
through engagement in regional forums or in regional mediation initiatives); (c) 
procedural mechanisms (for example, shura council, diwaniyya); and, (d) traditional 
legitimation or the reference to a foundational myth.
54
We applied the following 
coding rules to generate the fuzzy scale of leg-claim:  
(1)We coded0if there is no religious legitimation observable,and0.6ifthere is.  
(2) If, in addition to no religious legitimation, one or two of the secondary aspects 
can be observed, we coded 0.2. If one or two secondary aspects and religious 
legitimation can be observed together, we coded 0.8.  
(3) If, in addition to no religious legitimation, three or four of the secondary aspects 
can be observed, we coded 0.4. If three or four of the secondary aspects and 
religious legitimation can be observed, we coded 1.  
 
(E) Hard repression (repression) 
In order to calibrate hard repression, we use data on purges, deﬁned as “any sys-
tematic elimination by gaoling or execution of political opposition within the ranks 
of the regime or the opposition”.
55 
The source is the Cross-National Time Series Data 
Archive founded by Arthur Banks (indicator domestic5). This data set is the only 
source available providing data on all the 13 monarchies and in particular dating 
back to 1945. As Banks himself concedes, this data is mostly based on New York 
Times reports and might thus tend to underestimate the true intensity of purges. We 
decided, therefore, to apply a minimal coding of repression that relies on a 
binominal measurement of having at least one event of purging  
within a country period – coded as 1 – or of having no purges reported in the Banks 
data – coded as 0.  
Tests for necessary and sufﬁcient conditions  
Combined set-theory values for the ﬁve conditions aresummarizedinTable3in the 
Online Appendix. There are 34 cases of survival (survival) and ﬁve cases of 
breakdown (~survival).
56 
The breakdown cases are: Egypt 1945 – 1952, Iraq 1945 – 
1958, North-Yemen 1955 – 1962, Libya 1951 – 1969, and Iran 1953 – 1979. Using 
this data, we construct a truth table (Table 4 in the Online Appendix) that shows that 
there are 32 theoretically possible combinations of the ﬁve conditions using a 
binominal ideal-type value space. Eighteen of these conﬁgurations are represented 
by empirical cases with a membership greater than 0.5.
57 
Fourteen conﬁgurations are 
ﬁlled by cases of surviving monarchies,
58 
one of which also includes a case of 
monarchical breakdown.
59 
Four conﬁgurations are ﬁlled exclusively by cases of 
breakdown.
60 
 
Our tests for necessity (Table 5 in the Online Appendix) yield no single necess-
ary condition for either the survival or breakdown of monarchies in the Middle  
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East.
61 
We then proceed to the tests for sufﬁciency. Both procedures have been 
carried out for survival (survival, Table 1) as well as for breakdown (~survival, 
Table 2).
62 
Our results from the tests for sufﬁciency point in a similar direction: there 
is no single condition that is, in itself, sufﬁcient to ensure monarchical survival or 
breakdown. Instead there are, as we have found, a number of causal complexities. A 
condition that can lead under certain circumstances to survival can also lead to 
breakdown under different ones, and combinations of conditions are found to be 
jointly sufﬁcient in forming pathways towards either survival or breakdown. These 
conditions are called INUS conditions.
63 
The results of our tests for sufﬁciency are 
presented in Tables1 and 2.  
As is evident from Table1, there are in total seven pathways to survival
64
; the 
ﬁrst covers the classical linchpin monarchies of Jordan and Morocco. It highlights 
the importance of the historical-religious claim to legitimate rule despite the absence 
of high rents and family participation. The last two pathways (6 and 7) explain the 
survival of all of the Gulf monarchies (with the exception of Oman). A combination 
of high rent revenues and the participation of family members in political 
decision-making without using hard repression are of key importance in Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. A distinct pathway (7) exclusively for 
Saudi Arabia illustrates the speciﬁcity of this kingdom: Rent revenues and family 
participation are accompanied with a strong claim to legitimate rule.  
The remaining four pathways (2 –5) form an interesting cluster, emphasizing the 
hybrid nature of Oman and the Imamate in North Yemen. Both overlap, for different 
reasons, with at least one of the linchpins or dynastic monarchies. The North 
Yemeni Imamate holds similar structural conditions with Morocco and some 
historical periods of Jordan (2). On the other hand, the early Yemeni periods had 
similarities with the evolution of the Saudi Kingdom until 1964 (4). Omanis quite 
similar to contemporary Jordan (3), enjoying strong external support and legitimacy 
claims combined with low family participation and no hard repression. At the same 
time, the Sultanate resembles many structural features of the Saudi Kingdom after 
1964 (5): a combination of strong external support, rent revenues, legitimacy claims, 
and the absence of hard repression. These combinations in between the classical 
linchpin and the classical dynastic monarchies underline that there are historical 
formations of monarchies in the Middle East that blur the long-held dichotomy of 
linchpin vs dynastic monarchies in the region.  
The solution for breakdown (as depicted in Table 2) consists of three terms that 
cover four of the historical cases of monarchical breakdown.
65 
It reveals three central 
ﬁndings: First, pathways to monarchical breakdown seem to be very complex and 
are not merely the opposite of pathways explaining survival.
66 
Second, the lack of 
family participation is common to all pathways of monarchical breakdown, while 
the remaining conditions differ depending on the speciﬁc case.
67 
Only one pathway is 
shared by more than one case (no. 3 in Table 2), pointing to structural similarities 
between the two “rentier linchpins” of Libya and Iraq. Third, and somewhat 
surprisingly, the impact of hard repression, rent revenues, and legitimacy claims is 
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not straightforward. The use or non-use of hard repression seems to be largely 
irrelevant for monarchical survival. Repression is also not efﬁcient in shielding a 
monarchy, which enjoys strong external support and high rent revenues as the 
example of Iran 1979 demonstrates. Iraq in the 1950s and Libya in the 1960s each 
had high rent revenues and a claim to historical-religious legitimacy, yet also broke 
down. Rent revenue thus does not seem to be a particularly strong stabilizing factor 
in itself either, since it is found in three of four (or ﬁve, if one includes North 
Yemen) cases of breakdown.  
Discussion of results and conclusions  
Drawing on the insights from but also moving beyond the recent debates on mon-
archies in the Middle East, we suggest a historical-conﬁgurative explanation for the 
survival of this subtype of authoritarian regimes. Based on a systematic fsQCA of 
all 13 monarchies that have existed in the region between 1945 and 2012 and by 
looking at the ﬁve core conditions – strategic external support, rent revenues, family 
participation in political decision-making, the claim to legitimacy, and hard 
repression – a number of conclusions can be drawn.  
The most striking ﬁnding is that beyond the well-known “classical” dualism 
separating dynastic (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) from 
linchpin monarchies (Jordan and Morocco), we identify a third, hybrid pathway 
containing the Sultanate of Oman as well as some historical periods of the Imamate 
of North Yemen. Taken together, these three pathways demonstrate one of the core 
strengths of QCA, namely to have largely independent explanations for the same 
outcome (equiﬁnality).  
The identiﬁcation of a third category, represented by only one contemporary 
case, highlights another strength of Boolean analysis. Each case retains its 
context-speciﬁc importance thereby allowing otherwise often marginal or outlier 
cases to appear prominently in a separate pathway. So while neither Oman nor the 
Yemeni Imamate fall together in one category, they both represent speciﬁc historical 
formations which lie outside the dominant dualism of monarchy studies in the 
Middle East. Apart from clarifying our knowledge about the development of both 
the classical linchpin and dynastic regimes, their pathways reveal the blended nature 
of the survival strategies of Oman and earlier North Yemen, which stand apart from 
the other Middle Eastern monarchies. Deviating from especially Morocco and all of 
the smaller Gulf monarchies, Oman shares a combination of a lack of systematic 
family rule and strong legitimacy claims with Jordan. On the other hand, the 
Sultanate intersects with its direct northern neighbour Saudi Arabia in that it 
displays a combination of rent revenues with high levels of traditional legitimacy 
claims. Interestingly, Oman is the only surviving oil-rich monarchy without 
systematic family participation. Historically speaking, it highlights the possibility 
that also rentier linchpins – other historical examples being pre1958 Iraq and 
pre-1969 Libya – were able to overcome deadly domestic challenges. While neither 
Iraq nor Libya enjoyed the strategic importance of contemporary Oman (high 
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external support), the latter case highlights the importance of not using hard 
repression when enjoying high oil revenues and being of strategic importance to the 
West. This is a lesson the last Shah of Iran ignored, while at the same time he was 
unable to base his legitimatory claims on the same strong historical and religious 
sources as Sultan Qaboos does today.  
The Imamate of North Yemen, instead, quite similar to Morocco and Jordan on 
the one hand, was a fascinating example of a family-dominated regime based on 
strong religious legitimacy claims without controlling much oil revenue. Histori-
cally, this is maybe the only example of a failed would-be dynastic monarchy, 
sharing many similarities with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia before 1964. The 
Imamate of Yemen sheds light on an important historical precondition of the evol-
ution of dynastic monarchies. Oil revenues were instrumental in order to ﬁnance 
other family members as well as a family-based modern state bureaucracy. This 
connection is sometimes forgotten when looking at the remarkable stability of the 
contemporary monarchies in the Gulf. It is both family participation and oil rev-
enues which were and still are crucial for the survival of ﬁve of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) members. However, one important caveat remains: 
While the survival of the Imamate in North Yemen is explained by the fourth 
pathway as highlighted in Table 1, the fsQCA incorrectly assumes that the break-
down period is part of this survival pathway. This is where further historical 
research is needed. It might be that additional aspects like an external invasion, as 
argued by Herb,
68 
may account for this speciﬁcity.  
Our ﬁndings for explaining monarchical breakdown are much more complex 
than those for survival, and therefore lack the degree of generalization we achieved 
in the case of the latter. To start with, the counterfactually generated Boolean sol-
utions are not just the opposite of our explanations for survival. This asymmetric 
causality, an additional major strength of Boolean analysis, is an important aspect to 
bear in mind when interpreting our results. The complexity of the interaction with 
other conditions makes clear that breakdown seems to be an event that occurs only 
under very speciﬁc historical circumstances. Additionally, the breakdown results 
evince that a number of prominent factors, as outlined in the literature, have an 
ambiguous, context-sensitive impact. Most notably, high rent revenues, were present 
in three out of four of the broken down monarchies – contradicting the strong claim 
that they might be singly sufﬁcient for authoritarian survival, an argument often 
made in the early rentier state literature. A more general reason for the lower degree 
of generalization with regard to monarchical breakdowns relates to the 
“survival-centric” literature of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. There is no 
condition in the literature on Middle East monarchies that has a clearly theorized 
causal impact on monarchical breakdown. On the contrary, apart from family 
participation, each condition supposedly conducive to survival may potentially also 
contribute to breakdown if and when it is combined with various other conditions. 
There is, hence, a clear need for greater emphasis on a distinct breakdown-centred 
research to gain more insights into the speciﬁcities of this phenomenon.  
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What are some of the lessons that can be drawn from this historical-comparative 
perspective regarding some of the recent developments among monarchies in the 
context of the “Arab Uprisings”? Due to the equiﬁnal paths, different lessons can be 
drawn for different types of monarchies. The major lesson for linchpins is to prevent 
an erosion of their historical-religious legitimacy claim. Ongoing developments in 
Jordan and Morocco, however, do not signify a historical similarity with this (yet). 
Gulf monarchies instead need to conserve their combination of family rule and oil 
rent revenues – contemporary Bahrain is a case in point. If one of the two conditions 
weakens, the authoritarian monarchy might risk ending up like Iran in 1979 or 
getting in increasingly tense intra-family power struggles. The continuing 
positioning of royal family members in the highest state ofﬁces – arguably coupled 
with a better allocation of oil-rent spoils – remains, therefore, the single most impor-
tant strategy the Bahraini monarchy could employ to survive in the long term.  
Safeguarding family participation also plays an overarching role for most of the 
other oil-exporting Gulf monarchies. If they were to abandon this practice and to 
rely instead on historical-religious claims to legitimize their rule, they might ﬁnd 
themselves progressing towards the structural situations that monarchical Iraq and 
Libya experienced more than four decades ago. It is thus the erosion of the domestic 
factors of family participation and legitimacy claims that fosters those critical 
moments in which breakdown becomes a real possibility. External factors like 
strategic military support and rents are, in themselves, not sufﬁcient to ensure 
survival – but they can be very powerful instruments if combined with domestic 
conditions. This is, ultimately, perhaps the most crucial lesson to be learned in the 
still ongoing events of the “Arab Uprisings”.  
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Notes  
1. In addition to Bahrain, Morocco and Jordan, the other ﬁve contemporary authoritarian 
monarchies in the Middle East are Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. 
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2. Owen, Arab Presidents.  
3. Lucas, “King’s Dilemma”;Yom and Gause III, “Resilient Royals.”  
4. Lucas, “Monarchical Authoritarianism.”  
5. Herb, All in the Family.  
6. Huntington, Political Order.  
7. Ibid., 177.  
8. Anderson, “Absolutism,” 1.  
9. Ibid.  
10. There are three prominent cultural(ist) approaches to Middle Eastern monarchies: The 
ﬁrst stresses the mutually reinforcing ideological connections between monarchies and Islam 
(Lewis, “Monarchy”), allegedly allowing the Jordanian, Moroccan, and Saudi Arabian kings 
a peculiar kind of religious legitimacy. Lewis’ take, however, tends to underestimate the 
often-contradictory effects of monarchical attempts at Islamic legitimation. In addition, a 
number of monarchies currently exist without any religious legitimacy at all (Kuwait, Qatar, 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)). The second culturalist perspective stresses the 
dominance of patriarchal social structures (Ben Dor, State and Conﬂict). This perspective can, 
however, be countered by pointing out that it is not only monarchs who act as “national father 
ﬁgures” in the region; many presidents in the Middle East have behaved in quite similar ways 
in this regard. Third, Menaldo has recently put forward the idea of a speciﬁc monarchical 
political culture that allows for credible commitment, see Menaldo, “Resilient Monarchs.” 
However, it is important to point out that his dependent variable is political turmoil rather 
than regime survival or breakdown.  
11. Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations, 81–3; Yom, “Jordan,” 163.  
12. Snyder, “Sultanistic Regimes,” 58.  
13. Gause III, Oil Monarchies, 127.  
14. Yom and Gause III, “Resilient Royals,” 85; for a similar argument on the pre-“Arab 
Uprisings” see Frisch, “Why Monarchies Persist.”  
15. Gause III, Oil Monarchies.  
16. Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production State.”  
17. Yom and Al-Momani, “International Dimensions.”  
18. Herb, All in the Family.  
19. Lucas, “Monarchical Authoritarianism.”  
20. Herb, All in the Family, 235.  
21. Herb explicitly excludes North Yemen from his analysis. Ibid., 17.  
22. An alternative institutionalist account is provided by Lucas, Politics of Survival.  
23. Hudson, Arab Politics; Schlumberger, “Old Bottles.”  
24. Schlumberger, “Old Bottles,” 239 – 46.  
25. In Jordan, the Hashemite king can trace his descent back to the Muslim prophet 
Muhammad. In Morocco as well, the Alaoui king – as the amir al-mu’minin –isa descendant 
of Muhammad. In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the country’s nomenclature itself denotes 
the ruling family, which has been closely associated since the eighteenth century with the 
strict Wahhabi interpretation of Hanbali Islam. As the khadim al-haramain, the Saudi royal 
family attains further religious legitimacy in hosting and organizing the annual Islamic 
pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina.  
26. Krämer, “Good Counsel.”  
27. Demmelhuber, “Political Reform.”  
28. Schlumberger, “Old Bottles,” 243 – 45.  
29. Bellin, “Robustness”; Spinks, Sahliyeh, and Calfano, “Status of Democracy.”  
30. Spinks, Sahliyeh, and Calfano, “Status of Democracy,” 329ff.  
31. Josua and Edel, “To Repress.”  
32. Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East.”  
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33. Ibid., 130 –5.  
34. Yom and Gause III, “Resilient Royals,” 85.  
35. Herb, All in the Family.  
36. A condition is deﬁned as being necessary if it must be present for a certain outcome to 
occur (Ragin, Comparative Method, 99). Thus tests for necessity attempt to verify whether a 
condition is always there if a certain outcome occurs; however, necessary conditions might 
also be present even if the outcome does not occur. A condition is deﬁned as being sufﬁcient 
if by itself it can produce a certain outcome. Tests for sufﬁciency attempt to verify whether a 
condition always leads to the same outcome; thus, sufﬁcient conditions are not present if the 
outcome does not occur.  
37. Berg-Schlosser et al., “Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as an Approach,” 2.  
38. Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science.  
39. Fiss, “Building Better Causal Theories,” 402.  
40. Ibid.  
41. Two controversial cases – Tunisia before independence 1956 and the Federation of South 
Arabia – were not included since we focus our analysis exclusively on independent states.  
42. Smaller periods, which we call transition periods – like the ofﬁcial rule by Farouk’s son 
Fuad II in Egypt between 1952 and 1953, which came after the Free Ofﬁcers took power – 
are not considered an appropriate unit of analysis. A complete list of accepted transition 
periods is attached toTable3in the Online Appendix. Since the UAE consists of seven 
different sheikhdoms, with each experiencing different cycles of succession, strictly speaking 
we would have to consider each emirate an independent country unit. We decided, therefore, 
to take Abu Dhabi – as the leading emirate – as representative of the whole federation in our 
analysis.  
43. Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups.”  
44. Marshall and Marshall, “Dataset Coups d’État.”  
45. Note that we do not code the crossover point of 0.5 of survival explicitly. The decision 
whether a case belongs to the value space above or below 0.5 is exclusively made by looking 
at regime survival (breakdown below 0.5 and survival above 0.5).  
46. Available at http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background (1 July 2013).  
47. Ragin, “Fuzzy Sets.”  
48. Basedau and Lay, “Resource Curse.”  
49. Lucas and Richter, Taxation, Distribution and Authoritarian Regime Longevity.  
50. Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production State.”  
51. Herb, All in the Family, 8. Please note that we do only code family participation and not 
dynastic monarchies. There is an important difference between both concepts, as Herb 
himself notes: “ ...it is the rise of the ruling dynasties to dominate the petro-state that best 
explains the survival of the monarchies” (Ibid., 52). Oil and family participation only jointly 
created dynastic monarchies.  
52. Beetham, Legitimation of Power.  
53. Sponsoring the build-up of mosques or the mere reference to righteous religious 
behaviour in speeches by the monarch or important regime actors does not sufﬁce for a 
country to be coded above 0.5.  
54. Beetham, Legitimation of Power.  
55. Banks, “Data Archive,” 11. Please note that in our understanding the repression of local 
or regional rebellions, like for instance the secessionist movement in Dhofar (south of Oman) 
during the 1970s, does not fall under the scope of this deﬁnition.  
56. The “~ ” sign signiﬁes membership below the threshold of 0.5, while no sign represents 
membership above the value of 0.5.  
57. The 14 rows that are not represented by empirical cases are called logical remainders. 
While there is no clearly established guideline regarding how many rows can be logical 
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remainders, with ﬁve conditions, 14 nevertheless seems a plausible number.  
58. TheseareRows1 –7,9 –10,14,and16 –18inTable4ofthe Online Appendix, covering 34 
country periods in total.  
59. This is Row7inTable4, where one historical period of monarchical survival in North 
Yemen clusters together with the time period of 1955 – 1962, which was ended by a 
republican revolution.  
60. Rows 8, 12, 13, and 15 represent four historical cases of monarchical breakdown.  
61. Schneider and Wagemann, Qualitative Comparative Analysis, suggest a consistency level 
of 0.90 as the threshold value for a necessary condition, none of our conditions or their 
inverse fulﬁls this criterion.  
62. All tests were run with fsQCA Version 2.5, software that can be downloaded at: http:// 
www.u.arizona.edu/cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml (18 July 2010).  
63. INUS conditions are insufﬁcient but necessary parts of a condition that is itself 
unnecessary to, but sufﬁcient for, the result Schneider and Wagemann, Set-Theoretic 
Methods, 79.  
64. For further elaboration and formalization see the Online Appendix, Table 6.  
65. For further elaboration and formalization see the Online Appendix, Table 7.  
66. However, since there is a limited number of breakdown cases to begin with, the pathways 
are of the maximum possible length since no meaningful Boolean minimization could be 
undertaken.  
67. The country period of North Yemen between 1955 and 1962 falls within a pathway of 
monarchical survival (no.7inTable4of the Online Appendix), even though it is a case of a 
broken down monarchy. It has, therefore, not been analysed as part of the monarchical 
breakdown QCA that is presented in Table 2.  
68. Herb, All in the Family, 17.  
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